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CHAPTER  FOUR
Medieval Mystics on Persons*
What  John  Locke  Didn ’t  Tell  You
Christina Van Dyke
The thirteenth to fifteenth centuries were witness to lively and broad- 
ranging debates about the nature of persons. In logical and gram-
matical discussions, “person” indicated individuality (as opposed to 
universality or commonality). In the legal- political realm, “person” 
separated subjects from objects, whos from whats. In theological con-
texts, “person” appears most often in Trinitarian and Christological 
debates: God was three persons in one Being, and Christ was one per-
son with two natures (human and divine), where the broadly accepted 
definition of person was Boethius’s “an individual substance with a 
rational nature.”
 * For their feedback on earlier drafts of this essay, I am grateful to audiences at the Society of Fellows 
in the Humanities at Columbia University, at Georgetown University, and at the Symposium in 
Ancient and Medieval Philosophy— Feminine* Perspectives in Montreal.
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In this chapter, I look at how these uses of “person” overlap in the 
works of thirteenth- to fifteenth- century contemplatives in the Latin 
West, such as Hadewijch, Meister Eckhart, and Catherine of Siena. 
After explicating the key concepts of individuality, dignity, and ratio-
nality, I show how these ideas combine with the contemplative use of 
first and second person perspectives, personification, and introspec-
tion to yield a concept of “person” that both prefigures Locke’s classic 
seventeenth- century definition and deeply influences the development 
of personalism.
1  Background
By the thirteenth century, the Latin word persona was regularly 
employed in the Latin West in a number of different contexts: gram-
matical, logical, legal, political, and theological. As  chapters 1– 3 dem-
onstrate, these contexts have complicated, overlapping histories. For 
the purposes of this chapter, a general overview of the main traditions 
is all that is necessary: my goal is merely to identify the core concepts 
each contributes to the working notion of “person” in the thirteenth 
to fifteenth centuries.1
Grammatical and Logical Context
Twelfth- century logical and grammatical discussions use persona both 
to distinguish constructions with a subject from those without one 
and to contrast individuals with classes, species, groups, and univer-
sals. In suppositional theory, for instance, personal supposition applies 
when there is an individual subject for a grammatical sentence (such as 
“Hildegard wrote to the bishop”), in contrast with impersonal supposi-
tion (such as “It is true that Hildegard was an abbess”). In grammatical 
 1 See Theo Kobusch, Die Entdeckung der Person: Metaphysik der Freiheit und modernes Menschenbild 
(Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1997).
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and logical contexts, the distinction drawn between persona (as indi-
vidual) and populus (as a particular group of persons) becomes com-
mon enough that the plural of “person” eventually becomes “people” 
in the emerging English vernacular, rather than “persons”— a term 
increasingly reserved for technical discussions.
These contrasts yield a grammatical and logical notion of “person” 
that emphasizes subjective individuality. Another feature that “per-
son” connotes in these contexts is incommunicability. Universals such 
as “human being” or “green” are inherently communicable insofar as 
they can be instantiated in any number of objects both at a time and 
over time. My mother and my sister are both human beings at the same 
time as seven billion others; the leaves on the trees outside my win-
dow are green now, as were the different leaves on the same trees last 
year. Humanness and greenness are properties that can be shared in 
this way. Persons, by contrast, are not universals. They are inherently 
nonrepeatable and cannot be shared or held in common between indi-
viduals. Incommunicability carries theological significance in medi-
eval Trinitarian explanations of how God can be three persons in one 
being. It also becomes relevant in philosophical and theological discus-
sions during the Averroeistic controversies in the thirteenth century, 
which center on whether there is a universal agent intellect for all indi-
vidual human thinkers.2
Legal and Political Context
The concept of person is firmly established in the Roman tradition in 
the first century bce. The Latin term persona captures the different 
sorts of roles available to individual human beings within Roman law, 
such as spouse, property owner, or defendant, drawing on the way the 
Greek word prosopon referred not just to the masks used in drama but 
 2 For further discussion of the importance of the property of incommunicability for persons, espe-
cially as it applies in theological contexts, see  chapter 2.
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also to the various roles indicated by those masks. Roman law was set 
up in terms of the relation between persons (personae), things (res), 
and events or transactions (actiones)— a distinction that carries over 
into western legal theory. By the twelfth century, when Gratian com-
piles the Decretum, the term “person” indicates an individual subject 
who has certain inherent rights, capacities, and duties. The Decretum 
and subsequent Decretals become “the” source for canon law in the 
Middle Ages and beyond, and thus establish this concept of person as 
central in both civil and religious legal discussions.3
Given the extensive overlap between legal and religious life in this 
period, it comes as little surprise that theologians and philosophers as 
well as canon lawyers knew the Decretals, drew from them as necessary, 
and frequently used the word persona as well as homo in discussions 
with legal overtones.4 The concept of persona (and its distinction from 
res) also features in the increasingly sophisticated medieval theories of 
just war theory. Discussions of right conduct in war (jus in bello), for 
instance, employ the concept of person in detailing appropriate rules 
of conduct toward the enemy, whether combatants, noncombatants, 
or prisoners of war. The concept of “person” is also used in delineat-
ing a group of human beings who merit special protection under the 
law: miserabiles personae (lit.: persons deserving of mercy or pity). One 
of the main considerations in generating this category was ensuring 
that all persons had access to fair legal representation by the clergy.5 
Meant to pick out those who are simultaneously in need and worthy 
of aid, the term originally applies to widows, children (particularly 
 3 The Decretals, for instance, continued to be used by Roman Catholic Church canons until 1918. 
For an overview of Gratian’s compilation of the Decretum and the history of the Decretals, see 
Brian Tiereny, Medieval Poor Law: A Sketch of Cannonical Theory and Its Application in England 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1959), 7– 10.
 4 See, for instance, Aquinas’s discussion of marriage in Summa contra gentiles 3.125.
 5 “The term miserabiles personae was used, in the Decretum and thereafter, to designate precisely a cat-
egory of persons recommended to judicial benevolence, whom the clergy would represent in cases 
where this was normally forbidden.” Janet Coleman, “Property and Poverty,” in The Cambridge 
History of Medieval Political Thought c.  350– c. 1450, ed. J. H. Burns (Cambridge:  Cambridge 
University Press, 1988), 627.
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orphans), and the poor; by the mid- thirteenth century it has been offi-
cially expanded to include lepers, merchants, and pilgrims.6
The term miserabiles personae also appears in theological discussions 
from the thirteenth century onward. It is Francis of Assisi’s experiences 
with lepers (qua miserabiles personae), for instance, that convinced him 
that “every person without exception was seen to be graced with the 
same inestimable worth and dignity given by God, one to another.”7 
The idea that all human beings are equal in the eyes of God and that 
the “least of these” need to be treated with respect and compassion 
becomes increasingly central in the age of the mendicant orders, which 
are established in the early thirteenth century.
Associated with Christ as the Second Person of the Trinity and 
with human beings both via the Incarnation and via humans’ cre-
ation in God’s image, dignity also becomes one of the features that 
distinguishes persons (personae) from things (res). Thus, the radical 
Franciscan Ubertine de Casale, in his Arbor vitae crucifixae Iesu (1305), 
denounces “stripping the poor Crucified One [Christ] in the persons 
of the poor, who had a right to be sustained in dignity by creation” 
(1.1). Casale argues that treating a pauper as lacking in dignity or worth 
is equivalent to treating God that way; the poor possess a positive right 
to better treatment. Legal and political notions of persons overlap here 
with grammatical and theological uses of the term: persons are sub-
jects, not objects or things; they are individuals with intrinsic worth.
Theological Context
So far, I have discussed the application of the term “person” primar-
ily to human beings. Yet, although all human beings were considered 
 6 For further discussion of this category and the complications involved in determining to 
whom it applied, see Robert Shaffern, Law and Justice from Antiquity to Enlightenment 
(Lanham, MD:  Rowman and Littlefield, 2009), 131– 133. See also Michael Cusato, “Poverty,” 
in the Cambridge History of Medieval Philosophy, ed. Robert Pasnau and Christina Van Dyke 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).
 7 Cusato, “Poverty,” 587.
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persons, no one in the Latin West in the thirteenth to fifteenth centu-
ries would have supposed that human beings were the only persons. 
Indeed, in theological contexts, discussions of persons focus much 
more on God’s nature than on humans’— particularly on how the term 
“person” applies to the mysteries of the triune God (who is professed to 
be three persons in one God) and the Incarnation (Christ as one per-
son with two natures).8 Discussions of human persons generally follow 
treatments of how the concept applies to Christ, the Second Person of 
the Trinity, who is both fully human and fully divine.9
Boethius’s definition of “person” as “an individual substance with 
a rational nature” is accepted as standard in the theology faculties 
at Paris and Oxford by the thirteenth century and employed by all 
major scholastics, including Aquinas and Bonaventure. Taking each 
part of the definition in turn, we see that— as in grammatical and 
logical contexts— one important feature of persons is individuality, 
where that involves subjectivity, particularity, and incommunicability. 
Theological discussions particularly emphasize the incommunicability 
involved in individuality in spelling out how the Three Persons of the 
Trinity remain distinct despite their being one God. As I’ll show in 
section 2, this idea of “personal distinction within unity” also provides 
medieval contemplatives with a model for both understanding and 
communicating mystical experiences of union with God.
The use of the term “substance” in Boethius’s definition indicates 
that persons have nondependent existence. That is, although God the 
Creator, God the Savior, and God the Holy Spirit are one God, the esse 
(being) of each Person of the Trinity is independent from the being of 
the other two Persons, in that the Savior is not dependent for existence 
 8 Nestorianism is the objectionable view in the neighborhood, where Christ’s human and divine 
natures are viewed as separate persons.
 9 For a detailed philosophical discussion of the concept of “person” specifically as it relates to the 
Incarnation, see Timothy Pawl, In Defense of Conciliar Christology (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2016).
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on the Creator, nor the Spirit on the Savior, nor the Creator on the 
Spirit, and so on.
In the case of human beings, this aspect of the definition of “person” 
raises questions about the nature of the rational soul— in particular, 
whether the soul is a substance in its own right or only one part of the sub-
stance that is the human being. On the one hand possessing the capacity 
for independent subsistence is one of the primary characteristics of a sub-
stance, and the rational soul was widely believed to subsist in separation 
from matter between death and the general resurrection. On the other 
hand the doctrine of the bodily resurrection was taken to entail that body 
and soul together make up the human being, and the view that the soul 
is the human being or the person was associated with gnostic heresies.10
Debates about the status of the rational soul rage throughout the 
thirteenth century,11 but general consensus emerges that the soul is, 
by nature, only part of the human person and, thus, cannot be a per-
son in its own right. As Bonaventure writes in his discussion of the 
assumption of the Virgin Mary, “[Mary’s] blessedness would not have 
been complete unless she were there [in heaven] as a person. The soul 
is not a person, but the soul joined to the body is a person. Thus, it is 
clear that she is there in soul and in body.”12 Thomas Aquinas agrees, 
writing that in the case of human beings, “person” signifies “this flesh, 
these bones, and this soul” and stating definitively that “neither the 
name nor the definition of ‘person’ belongs to the rational soul.”13 As 
he explains in his Disputed Questions on Power, “the separated soul is 
 10 For detailed discussions of the philosophical issues this doctrine raises, and how Aquinas at 
least attempts to deal with them, see my “Human Identity, Immanent Causal Relations, and the 
Principle of Non- repeatability: Thomas Aquinas on the Bodily Resurrection,” Religious Studies 43 
(2007): 373– 394; “Not Properly a Person: the Rational Soul and ‘Thomistic Substance Dualism,’” 
Faith and Philosophy 26, no. 2 (2009): 186– 204; and “I See Dead People: Disembodied Souls and 
Aquinas’s ‘Two- Person’ Problem,” Oxford Studies in Medieval Philosophy 2 (2014): 25– 45.
 11 See Richard Dales, The Problem of the Rational Soul in the Thirteenth Century (Leiden: Brill, 1995), 
for a comprehensive discussion of the issues and which figures took which position on them.
 12 Assumption of the Blessed Virgin Mary I.2.9.
 13 Summa theologiae Ia 29.4.co and 29.1.ad5, respectively. The rest of ad 5 reads as follows: “the soul is 
part of the human species; for this reason, since it is still by nature unitable [to a body] even when 
it is separated, it cannot be the sort of individual substance which is called a ‘hypostasis’ or ‘first 
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part of [something with] a rational nature, namely, a human [being], 
but it is not the whole rational human nature, and therefore it is not a 
person.”14
As Aquinas’s response makes clear, the question of whether the 
human soul is a person touches not just on the soul’s ability to subsist 
in separation from the body but also on the fact that it is a rational 
soul. The stipulation in Boethius’s definition that a person is an indi-
vidual substance “with a rational nature” is crucial. It separates beings 
who are self- aware and reflective from those who are not, beings who 
are capable of consciously working toward their final ends and attain-
ing happiness (beatitudo) from those who merely move as they are 
naturally inclined.15 As Aquinas states in the Prologue to his exten-
sive discussion of morality in part 2 of the Summa theologiae, “What 
it means for us to be an image [of God] is that we are intellectual crea-
tures endowed with free choice and capable of controlling our own 
acts.”16 The medieval conception of “rational nature” encompasses all 
aspects involved in having control over one’s own actions— intellect 
and free choice of the will, first and foremost, but also memory, imagi-
nation, understanding, and creativity.
Individual substances with a rational nature— persons— are the only 
beings in the medieval world seen as capable of love and knowledge. 
Love in its ideal form is the desire for the highest good; knowledge 
in its purest form is possession of the truth. God is understood both 
as the Highest Good and as Truth itself, and so union with God in 
substance’ any more than a hand or any other part of a human being can.” All translations mine 
unless otherwise marked.
 14 Disputed Questions on Power 9.2.ad14.
 15 See Aquinas’s Treatise on Happiness (Summa theologiae IaIIae 1– 5) for further discussion, as well as 
his all- too- often overlooked discussion of happiness in Summa contra gentiles chaps. 25– 63.
 16 Prologue to the Treatise on Happiness and Human Acts (Summa theologiae I– II, Qq 1– 5). He 
immediately goes on to motivate his discussion of morality— the entire, massive, second part of 
Summa theologiae— as follows:  “Now that I  have discussed the one whom we image— namely, 
God— and the things that have issued from God’s power in accordance with his will, it remains 
for us to investigate God’s image— namely, human beings— insofar as we are the source of our own 
acts because we possess free choice and have power over what we do.”
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both intellective and volitional form is the final end (that is, happi-
ness) for all rational beings.17 This conception of the final end of per-
sons, particularly as it applies to human beings, becomes famously 
important in scholastic debates between the Dominicans (who tend 
to stress the centrality of intellect in the activity of perfect happiness) 
and Franciscans (who tend to stress the centrality of love). As I’ll show, 
this conception of God as our final end also features prominently in 
contemporaneous portrayals of mystical union and grounds the con-
templative emphasis on introspection and the self.
2 Individuality, Dignity, and Rationality 
in Medieval Contemplative Literature
Although the various contexts which employ the term “person” (logi-
cal/ grammatical, legal/ political, and theological) generate under-
standings of it with different emphases, none of these understandings 
are incompatible with the others. Rather, they overlap in ways that 
highlight three particular features:  agential individuality, intrinsic 
dignity, and self- reflective intellection and volition. In what follows, 
I discuss how these features of personhood appear and are developed 
in the contemplative and mystical literature of the thirteenth to fif-
teenth centuries. Modern philosophers have tended to overlook the 
medieval contemplative tradition(s), but this massive literature (which 
includes but is not limited to books of spiritual instruction, guided 
meditations, letters, poetry exploring the love between the soul and 
God, and reports of and reflections on mystical experiences) gives us 
much broader insight into medieval understandings of persons than 
 17 Only God enjoys this state in its fullest form; created beings share in participation to greater and 
lesser degrees. For a classic discussion of this, see Aquinas’s Treatise on Happiness. For second-
ary discussion, see Rebecca DeYoung, Colleen McCluskey, and Christina Van Dyke, Aquinas’s 
Ethics: Metaphysical Foundations, Moral Theory, and Theological Context (Notre Dame: University 
of Notre Dame Press, 2009), particularly the section on metaphysics.
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can be gleaned just from scholastic discussions, which tend to focus 
on set topics.
Scholastics and contemplatives alike in this period hold that human 
beings are persons. Because homo is the more specific term, however, 
it is used much more often than persona, which is applied to human 
beings primarily in contexts with legal overtones. As contemplative 
texts begin to appear in the vernacular as well as Latin, this prefer-
ence for using the species term for human beings is carried over; the 
word for “person” in whatever language (Middle Dutch, Middle High 
or Low German, Middle English, Tuscan Italian, etc.) is used almost 
exclusively for God— particularly Christ, as the Second Person of the 
Trinity.18
For the purposes of this chapter, the rise of texts composed in the 
vernacular has two central, related consequences. First, because both 
composing and reading in the vernacular is available to people with or 
without university education or formal training in Latin composition, 
these texts represent a wide range of voices. The thirteenth- century 
mystic Hadewijch, for instance, wrote her works in Middle Dutch 
and appears to have been highly educated and most likely came from 
a noble family, whereas the fourteenth- century Catherine of Siena was 
the twenty- fourth child of a cloth dyer and dictated the Dialogue in 
her native Tuscan dialect.
Second, the rise of the vernacular is associated with the develop-
ment of a new, deeply personal piety.19 This religious sensibility, which 
emphasizes humility and self- reflection, seeks a deeply emotional 
 18 This fact is often obscured in modern English translations of these texts, which tend to render the 
vernacular terms for “man” or “human being” as “person” to capture the more gender- neutral sense 
of those terms in their own time.
 19 For an extended discussion of this connection, see Barbara Newman, “Love Divine, All 
Loves Excelling,” in God and the Goddesses:  Vision, Poetry, and Belief in the Middle Ages 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2003), 138– 189. For “the” source on this general 
shift in religious devotion, see Herbert Grundmann, Religious Movements in the Middle Ages: The 
Historical Links between Heresy, the Mendicant Orders, and the Women’s Religious Movement in 
the Twelfth and Thirteenth Century, with the Historical Foundations of German Mysticism (Notre 
Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1995).
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attachment to the incarnate God. The wildly popular devotional 
Meditations on the Life of Christ (Meditationes vitae Christi), for 
instance, which is written in Latin but translated into the vernacular 
and disseminated widely, explicitly guides the reader in imaginatively 
placing herself at Christ’s birth, crucifixion, and death “as though you 
were hearing it with your own ears and seeing it with your own eyes.”20 
Arising in part in response to the gnostic heresies of the Cathars, 
this piety was also influenced by the popularity of the contemporary 
courtly love tradition. As Caroline Walker Bynum notes, “the major 
literary genres available in these [vernacular] languages were various 
kinds of love poetry and romantic stories: the vocabulary provided by 
such genres was therefore a vocabulary of feelings.”21
Although hardly the exclusive purview of women— men such as 
Bernard of Clairvaux, Francis of Assisi, Jan Ruysbroeck, and Richard 
Rolle also famously exemplify such piety at different times and in dif-
ferent places— this embodied and creative piety was particularly well- 
suited to women as they were perceived at this time, and the virtual 
explosion of affective devotional literature written by and for women 
across Europe in this period testifies to the extent to which it spoke 
to them,22 while the explicit ban on women entering universities 
and higher echelons of the church in the thirteenth to fifteenth cen-
turies means that these works are overwhelmingly composed in the 
 20 John of Caulibus, Meditations on the Life of Christ, trans. F. Taney, A. Miller, and C. M. Stallings- 
Taney (Asheville, NC: Pegasus Press, 2000), 4. The Meditationes is addressed to a woman, as was 
common from the 1200s onward. As Thomas Bestul notes, “this fact is a reflection of the expanded 
audience for devotional texts of all kinds occasioned by the increase in literacy, particularly among 
laypersons of the aristocratic and bourgeois classes, and the growth of opportunities for pri-
vate leisure and devotion.” “Meditatio/ Meditation,” in The Cambridge Companion to Christian 
Mysticism, ed. A. Hollywood and P. Dailey (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 163.
 21 “The Female Body and Religious Practice,” in Fragmentation and Redemption: Essays on Gender 
and the Human Body in Medieval Religion (New York: Zone Books, 1992), 196.
 22 For a good overview of this development, see Daniel Bornstein, “Women and Religion in Late 
Medieval Italy: History and Historiography,” in Women and Religion in Medieval and Renaissance 
Italy, ed. D. Bornstein and R. Rusconi, trans. Margery Schneider (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1996), 1– 27.
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vernacular.23 The development of this “vernacular piety” thus crosses 
gender lines as well as social hierarchies, including the split between 
religious and lay identities, making it an especially rich source for 
inquiry into the development of the notion of “person.”
Individuality and Agency
One feature of this more affective piety is an awareness of the self as 
an individual with subjective agency. Personhood might be a property 
all human beings possess simply by dint of existing, but humans’ status 
as persons comes with unique rights and responsibilities. All and only 
persons are capable of representing to themselves different potential 
courses of action, judging between those options, choosing which to 
enact, and reflecting on the results. In the case of human beings, the 
ability to choose consciously in accordance with or against God’s will 
separates humans from all other material creatures (who lack second- 
order reflective capacities) at the same time that it connects humans to 
the other sorts of beings (God and the angels) who are responsible for 
their actions and, thus, can be blame- or praise- worthy.
Although much can be said about medieval views concerning the 
collective nature of sin and guilt (particularly as it relates to original sin 
and its consequences), the status of the person qua individual is always 
what is most at stake in discussions of punishment and reward: a fact 
that carries gains particular force when the punishments and rewards 
in question are potentially eternal, as with damnation and salvation. In 
contemplative literature, the status of the person qua individual is also 
significant because unmediated union with God is achieved (or not) 
on an individual basis. At the same time, there is an apparent paradox 
 23 See Bynum, “The Female Body”; for a collection of the complications involved in the transmission 
of the works women wrote or dictated, primarily in the vernacular, see Catherine Mooney, ed., 
Gendered Voices: Medieval Saints and Their Interpreters (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 1999).
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here, insofar as it seems that particularity is precisely what is lost in 
mystical union.
As I’ve discussed elsewhere, contemplative attitudes toward 
individuality in mystical union and in the afterlife differ widely.24 
Contemplatives in the apophatic mystical tradition, for instance, such 
as Marguerite Porete, Meister Eckhart, and John Tauler, advocate a 
form of self- abnegation in which any sense of individual experience is 
lost.25 Porete, for instance (who is burnt at the stake in 1310 for refus-
ing to recant her views), describes the final stage of the spiritual life as 
one in which the human person so fully merges with God that it is as 
though she is “without existence, where she was before she was cre-
ated.”26 Eckhart also argues that in the quest to unite with God, one 
must cease to think of (or experience) oneself as a person with distinct 
intellects and wills, relinquishing individual personhood to become 
united with the Second Person and, thus, God.27
In explaining how emptying one’s self allows God to enter, Eckhart 
also appeals to the distinction between individual human beings and 
common human nature— a move that echoes the logical/ grammatical 
contrast between the individual member of a species and the common 
species nature itself. When God took on human nature and “united 
it with his own Person,” Eckhart writes, Christ assumed “bare human 
nature”— not the nature of any particular human being. Eckhart’s 
advice to human beings is to mimic this action to whatever extent pos-
sible: “The eternal Word did not put on a [particular] human being, so 
go out of whatever is a human being in you . . . and take yourself just as 
 24 See my “The Phenomenology of Immortality (1200– 1400),” in The History of the Philosophy 
of Mind, vol. 2, Philosophy of Mind in the Early and High Middle Ages, ed. M. Cameron 
(London: Routledge, 2019), 219– 239.
 25 The question of whether the person herself ceases to exist in the ultimate state of this sort of union 
is subject to debate; Porete appears to go the furthest toward advocating this possibility.
 26 Marguerite Porete, Mirror of Simple Souls, trans. E. L. Babinsky (Mahwah: Paulist Press, 1993), 
chap. 135.
 27 See Sermon 70 in Complete Mystical Works of Eckhart, trans. Maurice O’C Walshe (New York: The 
Crossroad Publishing Company, 2010).
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bare human nature, and then you will be the same to the eternal Word 
as human nature is to him. For between your human nature and his 
there is no difference: it is one, for it is in Christ what it is in you.”28 
This admonition highlights the sense in which emptying oneself of 
particularity is seen as a necessary precondition for merging with God 
on a level that allows one to identify oneself with God, because there is 
no individual self remaining, but only God.29 Johannes Tauler agrees, 
explaining that even devotion to God should be understood in terms 
of self- loss. Instead of portraying love as a burning fire (as Richard 
Rolle, Hadewijch, and Catherine of Siena do)30 or as a positive uniting 
or driving force, Tauler writes that the highest form of love “is nothing 
else than a loss of self, there is no affirmation. It does not consist of a 
possession . . . but it is a privation.”31
Other mystics, including Hadewijch, Angela of Foligno, and 
Mechthild of Magdeburg, talk of union with God in paradoxical 
terms that involve both self- loss and continued personal distinction. 
Hadewijch, for instance, writes of how God and the Beloved “pene-
trate each other in a way that neither of the two distinguishes himself 
from the other” but immediately goes on to comment that although 
“one sweet divine nature flows through both and they are both one 
thing through each other, at the same time they remain two different 
selves— yes, and remain so forever.”32
Angela of Foligno, a late thirteenth- century Franciscan tertiary, 
describes the regular experience of two different sorts of mystical 
 28 Sermon 92, Complete Mystical Works of Eckhart, Maurice O’C Walshe, 450.
 29 For discussion of this, see Ben Morgan, On Becoming God:  Late Medieval Mysticism and the 
Modern Western Self (New York: Fordham University Press, 2013).
 30 Rolle’s most famous work is titled simply The Fire of Love. Regarding Hadewijch see Letter 14 in 
Hadewijch: The Complete Works. ed. and trans. Mother Columba Hart, O.S.B. (Mahwah: Paulist 
Press, 1980), 76. Regarding Catherine see Catherine of Siena, The Dialogue, trans. Suzanne Noffke, 
O.P. (Mahwah: Paulist Press, 1980), 85.
 31 Sermon for the Twenty- Second Sunday after Trinity (V 76), as quoted in Bernard McGinn, The 
Harvest of Mysticism in Medieval Germany (1300– 1500), vol. 4 of The Presence of God: A History of 
Western Christian Mysticism (New York: Crossroad, 2005), 274; trans. Bernard McGinn.
 32 Letter 9.
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union: in the first, she is embraced in an unspeakable darkness in which 
she does not remember “anything about anything human, or the God- 
man [Christ], or anything which has a form” but in which she sees 
“all and nothing”; in the other, she experiences being in the God- man 
with “no intermediary between God and myself.” Angela connects this 
second sort of union quite closely with Christ’s humanity. Once, for 
instance, after looking at the cross (as encouraged by the Meditationes 
vitae Christi), she “saw and felt that Christ was within me, embracing 
my soul with the very arm with which he was crucified,” at which point 
she understands “how we will see that through [Christ] our flesh is 
made one with God.”33
Angela is hardly alone in this emphasis on the eternally embodied 
Second Person of the Trinity and its implications for the final end 
of humanity. Mechthild of Magdeburg, for instance, writes in her 
Flowing Light of the Godhead of the joy she feels on reflecting that 
“divine nature now includes bone and flesh, body and soul.” Christ’s 
nature as fully human and fully divine also provides Mechthild with an 
embodied model for the afterlife: “The soul with its flesh is mistress of 
the house in heaven, sits next to the eternal Master of the house, and is 
most like him.”34
Finally, other contemplatives, including Marguerite of Oingt, 
Richard Rolle, and Jan van Ruysbroeck, employ a clear “personal 
distinction within unity” model in their depictions of both mystical 
union and the afterlife. Marguerite of Oingt, a thirteenth- century 
Carthusian nun (and the author of some of the earliest extant texts 
written in Franco- Provençal) describes the beatified in her Mirror 
as completely immersed in God but nevertheless retaining distinct, 
individual existence:  “The saints will be within their Creator as the 
 33 Chapter  6, 4th Supplemental Step from the Memorial, in Angela of Foligno, Angela of 
Foligno: Complete Works, trans. Paul Lachance, O.F.M. (Mahwah: Paulist Press, 1993), 175.
 34 Mechtild of Magdeburg, The Flowing Light of the Godhead, trans. Frank Tobin. (Mahwah: Paulist 
Press, 1998) IV.14.
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fish within the sea: they will drink as much as they want, without get-
ting tired and without diminishing the amount of water. The saints 
will be just like that, for they will drink and eat the great sweetness of 
God.”35 In his Fire of Love, the influential fourteenth- century English 
mystic Richard Rolle describes affective embodied experiences of mys-
tical union that enhance intellective and volitional fulfilment, such 
as “glowing” or heat in the chest, a taste of unimaginable sweetness, 
and the sound of celestial music. Ruysbroeck— strongly influenced 
by the earlier Hadewijch— describes humans’ final end as a “blissful 
unity . . . in which there is nothing but God and the spirit united with 
God without intermediary.”36 He is explicit that this unity does not 
involve an actual loss of self, however: “I just said that we are one with 
God, something to which Scripture bears witness. I now wish to say 
that we must forever remain different from God, which is also taught 
us by Scripture.”37 Although united, human and divine persons remain 
forever distinct in this line of thought.
The concept of individuality plays a key role in contemplative 
thought in the thirteenth to fourteenth centuries, and is closely associ-
ated with both subjectivity and agency— whether as something to be 
lost or something to be retained. As I’ll show, this feature of person-
hood is also linked to the dignity and rationality (in the broad sense) 
that is central to the concept of “person” in this period.
 35 Chap. 2, para. 19, in The Writings of Margaret of Oingt, Medieval Prioress and Mystic (d. 1310), trans. 
(with introduction, essay, and notes) Renate Blumenfeld- Kosinski (Cambridge:  D. S.  Brewer, 
1990), 44.
 36 John Ruusbroec: The Spiritual Espousals and Other Works. Wiseman, John A., ed. and trans. O.S.B. 
(Mahwah: Paulist Press, 1985), bk. 2, pt. 4, p. 119.
 37 This is the opening of a section in The Sparkling Stone, titled “Our Union with God Is Not an 
Identification:  Four Ways of Experiencing This Union,” trans. p.  174. In his description of the 
Third Way, he writes that the “highest of all our experiences” is when we “feel ourselves to be one 
with God, for by means of our transformation in God we feel ourselves to be swallowed up in the 
groundless abyss of our eternal blessedness, in which we can never discover any difference between 
ourselves and God.” Nevertheless, “when we are raised up and drawn into this highest of all our 
experiences, our powers stand empty and idle in a state of essential enjoyment. They are not, how-
ever, annihilated, for in that case we would lose our creaturely status” (176, emphasis added).
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Dignity
The centrality of the dignity of the human person in the Italian 
Renaissance is well- known, and so it comes as little surprise that it fea-
tures prominently in the writings of fifteenth- century mystics such as 
Marsilio Ficino and Giovanni Pico della Mirandola.38 Ficino— deeply 
involved in the translation from Greek of Plato’s dialogues, the works 
of Plotinus, and other Platonists— stresses the role of dignity in human 
activities, not just as it manifests in intellection but as it appears “in 
every aspect of human creativity.”39 Pico della Mirandola disagrees 
with Ficino on how best to understand the nature of unitive love but 
shares Ficino’s emphasis on the importance of dignity for understand-
ing human nature and humans’ place in the cosmos. (His Oratio, in 
fact, becomes known as the Oration on the Dignity of Man.) What 
has at times been overlooked in these works, though, in looking for 
Platonism’s impact on Renaissance thought, is the extent to which 
their understanding of dignity is both contiguous with and indebted 
to that of the contemplative traditions which proceeded them.40
The concept of dignity appears extensively in earlier legal, political, 
and theological discussions of persons, and with considerable overlap 
between the contexts. In civil law and political theory, as I have shown, 
all human beings are considered persons— whos rather than whats, sub-
jects rather than things (res). As such, human beings possess certain 
 38 See, for instance, Paul Oskar Kristeller, “The Dignity of Man,” in Renaissance Concepts of Man and 
Other Essays (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), 1– 21, as well as any number of his other works on 
Ficino and Pico della Mirandola, and Charles Trinkaus, “In Our Image and Likeness”: Humanity 
and Divinity in Italian Humanist Thought, 2 vols. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970).
 39 Bernard McGinn, The Varieties of Vernacular Mysticism (1350– 1550), vol. 5 of The Presence of God: A 
History of Western Christian Mysticism (New York: Crossroad 2016), 257. For a helpful overview 
of Ficino and Pico della Mirandola’s Platonic- influenced mysticism, see McGinn, The Varieties of 
Vernacular Mysticism, 252– 284.
 40 McGinn acknowledges this, writing: “This work [Ficino’s Oratio], especially over the past three 
centuries, has been hailed as ‘the’ classic statement of Renaissance emphasis on human freedom 
and dignity, but it is actually a complex negotiation between Christian anthropology, based on 
Genesis 1:26 (man’s creation in the image and likeness of God), and Pico’s attempt to create a 
concordance of all sources of wisdom” (The Varieties of Vernacular Mysticism, 273).
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rights and responsibilities that set them off from “brutes” (nonrational 
animals), plants, and nonanimate objects, rights and responsibilities 
that ground which actions and events are permissible and which are 
impermissible. The boundary which marks off persons from things in 
legal and political theory corresponds precisely to the boundary which 
is drawn in theological discussions between persons, who have intel-
lects and free choice of the will, and the beings who lack such capaci-
ties. By the thirteenth century, the quality of dignity is consistently 
attributed not just to those fortunate enough to be born into the 
nobility but to human nature itself.41
Given the stress in contemplative literature on humility as a pre-
condition for spiritual growth,42 it might seem surprising that dignity 
would have an important role to play as well. Yet dignity features prom-
inently in the work of a number of contemplatives— and not as a vice 
but as humility’s complement. In Mechthild of Magdeburg’s Flowing 
Light of the Godhead, for instance, the Bride of Christ appears with 
four bridesmaids; the first is love, “clothed in chasteness and crowned 
with dignity,” and the second is humility, “clothed with lowliness and 
crowned with eminence.”43
The connection between humility and dignity also forms an impor-
tant theme in Catherine of Siena’s Dialogue (which would have been 
known to both Ficino and Pico della Mirandola). At the outset of 
the Dialogue, the best way to pursue truth is described as “continual 
humble prayer, grounded in the knowledge of herself and of God.”44 
 41 At the outset of the thirteenth century, for instance, Alexander Nequam writes in his Commentary 
on Proverbs that “in meditating on humanity, the meditator considers the dignity of human nature 
as well as its fragility”; as reported by Thomas H. Bestul from Nequam’s unpublished manuscript 
in Oxford, Jesus College, MS. 94, fol. 57r, in Bestul, “Meditatio/ Meditation,” 161.
 42 For a discussion of the role humility plays in spiritual progress, see my “‘Many Know Much, 
but Do Not Know Themselves’:  Self- Knowledge, Humility, and Perfection in the Medieval 
Affective Contemplative Tradition,” in Consciousness and Self- Knowledge in Medieval 
Philosophy: Proceedings of the Society for Medieval Logic and Metaphysics, vol. 14, ed. G. Klima and 
A. Hall (Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars, 2018), 89– 106.
 43 Flowing Light of the Godhead, bk. 1, chap. 46, p. 63.
 44 Dialogue, Prologue (1), 25.
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In response to that prayer, God tells Catherine that if she opens her 
mind’s eye and looks within God, she will see “the dignity and beauty 
of my reasoning creature” (la dignità e bellezza della mia creatura che 
ha in sé ragione).45 Humble prayer centered in introspection thus yields 
recognition of humans’ dignity as created by God and gifted with rea-
son. Knowledge of the complementary relation between humility and 
dignity is what later grants Catherine the ability to “stand with confi-
dence in God’s presence” to intercede for the world.46
The dignity of human persons is sometimes attributed in contem-
plative literature to humans’ status as image- bearers of God, as when 
Catherine of Siena writes: “In the gentle mirror of God she sees her 
own dignity: that through no merit of hers but by his creation she is 
the image of God.” Most often, however, it is directly attributed to 
the fact that the Second Person of the Trinity assumed human nature 
in the Incarnation.47 Marguerite Porete and the fourteenth- century 
English anchoress Julian of Norwich both attribute humans’ nobility 
to Christ’s, while the thirteenth- century Flemish beguine Hadewijch 
also makes it clear that human dignity comes via humans’ connec-
tion to the Incarnation, stressing Christ’s divine power and human 
justice:  “With his whole heart and his whole soul, and with all his 
strength, and in each and every circumstance, Christ was ready to per-
fect what was wanting on our part. And thus he uplifted us and drew 
us up by his divine power and his human justice to our first dignity, and 
to our liberty, in which we were created and loved, and to which we are 
 45 One of the standard English translations omits “dignity” and leaves “beauty,” which importantly 
obscures what Catherine is saying in this passage. As Suzanne Noffke notes in a footnote to her 
translation of the Dialogue, “la mia creatura che ha in sé ragione” is “one of Catherine’s favorite 
expressions for the human person”; 26, n. 3.
 46 Dialogue, 49. Our dignity stems from the goodness and love of the Creator, while humble recogni-
tion of our “wretchedness” opens us to experiencing Christ’s mercy, as she comments later (104).
 47 Catherine of Siena also reports God saying: “Because of the union I effected between my Godhead 
and human nature, your excellence and dignity is greater than that of the angels. . . . I, God, became 
a man, and humanity became God through the union of my divine nature with your human 
nature.” Dialogue, 205, modified translation.
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now called and chosen in his predestination.”48 The dignity conferred 
on humans by association with Christ also constitutes a standard to 
live up to. As Hadewijch writes in Letter 18, “Oh, you have much to 
do if you are to live the Divinity and the Humanity and come to full 
growth, according to the measure of the dignity in which you are loved 
and destined by God!”
In sum, the idea that human beings possess intrinsic dignity runs 
throughout the vernacular contemplative traditions of the thirteenth 
to fifteenth centuries. This dignity is linked to humans’ status as per-
sons qua subjective individuals, and is conferred via humans’ posses-
sion of the imago Dei and by the humanity of the Second Person of 
the Trinity, whose assumption of human nature links humans eternally 
with the divine.
Rationality
While dignity is a property that humans share with God, the most 
important point of similarity between human beings and God is 
humans’ rational natures (which in fact ground the dignity of all 
persons). As I  have discussed, the medieval conception of “rational 
nature” goes beyond mere reasoning abilities to include such things as 
intellection, volition, understanding, memory, love, and imagination. 
Scholastic discussions tend to take an impersonal, analytic approach 
in addressing what these powers are and how they are related in both 
human beings and in God:  the conflict between the Dominican 
emphasis on the primacy of knowledge and the Franciscan emphasis 
on love is well- known in the history of medieval philosophy, but not 
for its phenomenological insights. As one might expect, contemplative 
texts focus much more on first person experiences. They give counsel 
about how to cultivate spiritual progress (everything from “seek humil-
ity via introspection” to “abandon reason and knowledge altogether 
 48 Hadewijch: The Complete Works Letter 6, trans. Hart, p. 63.
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in order to conform your will with God’s”); they advise spiritual pil-
grims as to how to understand certain experiences (such as visions 
and auditions); they increasingly emphasize wisdom (sapientia) over 
formal knowledge (scientia); they both report and explicate first- hand 
mystical experiences. Taken as a whole, these discussions provide an 
important complement to the more familiar scholastic narrative about 
the concept of “person”— especially insofar as the contemplative texts 
demonstrate both the breadth and the depth of medieval understand-
ings of “rational nature” in relation to humans’ final end.
One of the primary purposes of contemplative literature in this 
period was to provide spiritual counsel. I’ve already shown various 
authors advising one to abandon one’s self in order to allow God to 
enter. That piece of advice by itself is insufficient, and so such authors 
also describe how to progress toward self- annihilation— a crucial stage 
of which involves abandoning the use of reason and any claims to 
knowledge. Marguerite Porete, for instance, who presents the Mirror 
of Simple Souls as a dialogue between the personifications of Love, 
Reason, and the Soul, portrays Reason primarily as the foil and coun-
terpart in Love’s all- important conversation with the Soul. When in 
 chapter 87 the Soul realizes that “Love has no beginning, no end, and 
no limit, and I  am nothing except Love,” Reason is so overcome by 
this pronouncement that she dies, and Love speaks in her place for the 
remaining fifty- one chapters.49
Meister Eckhart repeatedly counsels detachment as necessary for the 
sort of self- abnegation that allows humans to become one with God. 
Such detachment also requires humans to let go of reason. In Sermon 
76, for instance, he contrasts the type of knowledge that humans can 
have via their having one being with God with the knowledge that 
comes through reason and the senses: “The soul has something in it, 
 49 Porete, Mirror of Simple Souls, 162– 163. The Soul’s response to this death is to rejoice: “Why did 
it take so long, this death! For as long as I had you, Lady Reason, I could not freely receive my 
inheritance, what was and is mine. But now I can receive it freely, since I have wounded you to 
death with Love.”
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a spark of intelligence, which never goes out.  .  .  . There also exists in 
our souls a capacity for knowing external things. This is a knowing 
through the senses and through reason, that is, a knowing through sen-
sible images and through concepts. Such knowing conceals this other 
knowing from us. How are we Sons of God? By having one being with 
him.”50 Not only does the use of reason and knowledge of “external 
things” not help one in one’s quest for union, it actively impedes spiri-
tual progress. Johannes Tauler also counsels that we must leave reason 
behind. To expand on a passage quoted earlier: “This love is nothing 
else than a loss of self, there is no affirmation. . . . In it there is ignorance 
and unknowing; it is far above understanding, above all essence and 
modes of being.”51
The idea that reaching one’s ultimate end as human person requires 
abandoning the use of reason, and the knowledge it yields becomes 
an increasingly common theme from the late thirteenth to the four-
teenth centuries, even among contemplatives who don’t advocate self- 
annihilation. The popularity of downplaying or denigrating scientia, 
understood as formal knowledge arrived at via arguments and espe-
cially demonstrative syllogisms, reflects increasing dissatisfaction with 
the elitism of education in the universities and the increasingly special-
ized discussions they churned out.52 As Bernard McGinn notes, “in the 
course of the fourteenth century, the professionalization of scholastic 
theology and its increasing obsession with technical debates concern-
ing epistemology and language had clearly come to seem counterpro-
ductive for believers who sought more than just discourse about God.”53 
One of the most popular English devotional texts of the fourteenth 
 50 “Sermon 76,” in Meister Eckhart: Teacher and Preacher, ed. B McGinn, trans. B. McGinn, F. Tobin, 
and E. Borgstadt (Mawah: Paulist Press, 1986), 327– 328.
 51 Sermon for the Twenty- Second Sunday after Trinity (V 76), as quoted in McGinn, The Harvest of 
Mysticism in Medieval Germany.
 52 For more about the development of scientia in this period, see Robert Pasnau, “Medieval Social 
Epistemology: Scientia for Mere Mortals,” Episteme 7, no. 1 (2010): 23– 41.
 53 McGinn, The Harvest of Mysticism, 248.
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century, the anonymous work The Cloud of Unknowing, consistently 
stresses the importance of loving without knowing, informing its audi-
ence that God may be loved but cannot be understood: “by love may 
[God] be gotten and held; but by thought neither.”54 By the outset of 
the fifteenth century, frustration with technical scholastic discussions 
of minute details was widespread enough that Jean Gerson, a master 
at the University of Paris himself, gave two lectures titled “Against the 
Vain Curiosity of Students.”
Despite this trend, it is important to note that reason and knowl-
edge as well as wisdom and love remain central in the works of many 
contemplatives. The early twelfth- century Hugh of St. Victor was a 
staunch defender of the claim that reason and mysticism could have a 
close and mutually beneficial relationship; his works greatly influenced 
later “Victorine” and Augustinian contemplative attitudes toward the 
relation between intellect and spiritual progress. Hadewijch, the “most 
important exponent of love mysticism and one of the loftiest figures 
in the Western mystical tradition,” also praises reason and counsels its 
use.55 As she writes to a fellow beguine, “it is truly fitting that everyone 
contemplate God’s grace and goodness with wisdom and prudence: for 
God has given us our beautiful faculty of reason, which instructs us in 
all our ways and enlightens us in all works. If man would follow rea-
son, he would never be deceived” (Letter 14).56 Here, reason is seen 
as enhancing and guiding progress toward one’s final end, rather than 
impeding it.
 Other contemplatives known for their emphasis on the unifying 
power of love, such as Catherine of Siena and Julian of Norwich, also 
highlight the interplay between knowledge and love. Their under-
standing of what it means for human beings to have a “rational nature” 
 54 The Cloud of Unknowing, chap.  6, in English Mystics of the Middle Ages, ed. B. Windeatt 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 76.
 55 Preface by Paul Mommaers, S.J., to Hadewijch, xiii.
 56 Hadewijch, 77.
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involves all the components of the imago Dei, rather than stressing the 
role of the will to the exclusion of intellect, knowledge, or wisdom. 
The Dialogue in particular displays Catherine’s Dominican training, 
frequently characterizing the relationship between knowledge and 
love as a symbiotic spiral. When contemplating the “perfection of 
this unitive state in which souls are carried off by the fire of charity,” 
for instance, Catherine hears God tell her that in the fire of love with 
which beatified souls burn, they receive a “supernatural light” which 
lets them love God even more. “For love,” God goes on to say, “follows 
upon understanding. The more they know, the more they love, and the 
more they love, the more they know. Thus, each nourishes the other.”57
Some contemplatives even describe mystical union with God 
as enhancing their ability to reason. As Margaret Ebner, an 
early fourteenth- century German Dominican nun, writes in her 
Revelations: “I received a great grace from the inner goodness of God; 
the light of truth of divine understanding. Also, my mind became 
more rational than before, so that I had the grace to be able to phrase 
all my speech better and also to understand better all speech accord-
ing to the truth.”58 This gift also allows Ebner to perceive the truth in 
others: “I could understand, read, and write what I could not before, as 
I have already written. And a new understanding of truth was granted 
me, with which I can often detect when someone speaks untruthfully 
in my presence. When that happens, I  can answer nothing except 
that I  often have to say, ‘I believe that is not true.’ ”59 Such gifts are 
often explicitly linked to particular devotion to the Second Person of 
the Trinity, Christ, who is also identified with the personification of 
wisdom.60
 57 Catherine of Siena, Dialogue, 85.
 58 Margaret Ebner, Revelations, in Margaret Ebner: Major Works, trans. and ed. Leonard Hindsely 
(Mahwah:  Paulist Press, 1993), 100. Although little read today, Ebner’s correspondence with 
Henry Nordlingen is the earliest known extant exchange written in German.
 59 Ebner, Revelations, 155.
 60 See Barbara Newman, “Sapientia: The Goddess Incarnate,” in God and the Goddesses, 190– 244, 
for a detailed discussion of this identification and the ways it intersects with the also- prevalent 
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The range of understandings of both it means for persons to have 
a “rational nature” and which aspects of that nature were considered 
most important in achieving the final end of that nature is impressively 
broad— and contemplative literature employs and develops all three of 
the features which are central to thirteenth- to fifteenth- century con-
ceptions of persons: individual agency, inherent dignity, and “rational 
nature” (broadly understood). In the next section, I discuss how these 
features combine with the use of the first and second person perspec-
tives, personification, and an emphasis on self- reflection to produce a 
very “personal” understanding of what it means to be an individual 
substance with a rational nature.
3 Personal Perspectives, Personification, 
and Introspection
Scholastic texts typically take an impersonal approach to their sub-
jects. Disputed questions, for instance, lay out both sides of a debate 
and then “settle the matter,” beginning with the formulaic Respondeo 
dicendum (“I respond that it should be said that”). The goal of these 
works is to present the truth in an analytic, objective manner.61 
Contemplative literature, by contrast, is highly dynamic and often 
employs all three personal perspectives to give counsel, admonish 
wandering audiences (which include everyone from young beguines 
to bishops and popes), share insights, and express inner pains and joys. 
The first person perspective, for instance, is often used to report indi-
vidual mystical experiences and to give voice to Love, Soul, Reason, 
Body, etc., as well as in correspondence. The second person appears 
personification of Wisdom as a woman, particularly in the works of Henry Suso and Julian of 
Norwich.
 61 One can see that this is a feature of the genre rather than of the authors of such works by compar-
ing their theological treatises with their sermons and correspondence. Bonaventure and Eckhart 
are prime examples here: they express the same general ideas quite differently in their Latin theo-
logical writings and their more mystical writings and sermons.
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frequently in correspondence as well as in sermons, in books of coun-
sel, and in contexts where God or a personified quality is talking to 
the subject, or the subject is speaking directly to God. The third per-
son also appears, sometimes for modesty’s sake (as when Marguerite 
of Oingt, Mechthild of Hackeborn, and Catherine of Siena put their 
own divine revelations in the third person), sometimes by way of intro-
ducing the speaker (as at the outset of Julian of Norwich’s Showings), 
and often in hagiographies of mystics and contemplatives. This range 
of voices, which gives creative and fresh expression to time- honored 
images and themes, encourages the development of a sense of the self as 
such— setting the stage for later articulations of the person as the inner 
self, capable of self- conscious “reason and reflection.”62
The contemplative use of personification is particularly worth noting 
in this respect. Unlike the dialogues of the earlier Plato and Augustine, 
or the later Berkeley and Hume, the lively conversations found in the 
works of mystics like Marguerite Porete and Mechthild of Magdeburg 
take place between various facets of the inner self. As mentioned ear-
lier, Porete casts her Mirror of Simple Souls as a conversation between 
Soul, Love, and Reason; true to character, Reason consistently asks for 
explanations, while Love seeks to lead the Soul toward union. In one 
important exchange, Reason’s questions compel Love to share her true 
nature and foreshadow the self- abnegating union which Soul experi-
ences toward the close of the Mirror:
“To whom does [the Soul] belong then?” says Reason.
“To my will,” says Love, “which transformed her into me.”
“But who are you, Love?” says Reason. “Are you not one of 
the Virtues with us even though you be above us?”
 62 See, e.g., Locke’s famous definition of the person, discussed in section 4:  “thinking intelligent 
Being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider it self as it self, the same thinking thing in 
different times and places; which it does by that consciousness, which is inseparable from think-
ing”; Essay Concerning Human Understanding 2.27.9.
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“I am God,” says Love, “For Love is God and God is Love, and this 
Soul is God by the condition of Love. I am God by divine nature 
and this Soul is God by righteousness of Love. Thus this precious 
beloved of mine is taught and guided by me, without herself, for 
she is transformed into me.”63
By the end of the dialogue, it is only the Annihilated Soul who speaks, 
having become one with Love.
These dialogues employ personifications of Love, Reason, Virtues, 
and the like to portray inner conversations and conflicts, with the goal 
of both modeling and encouraging personal growth. The personifica-
tion of various aspects of the self in these dialogues is also often humor-
ous as well as instructive. In  chapter 2 of the first book of Mechthild’s 
Flowing Light of the Godhead (which moves between a number of 
genres, including poetry, prose, and dialogue), for instance, Soul leaves 
the body, sees “one complete God in three Persons and knows three 
Persons in one God undivided,” experiences “a blissful place”— and 
then is sent back down to earthly life, where she has a decidedly prosaic 
squabble with her body:
Then the body speaks: “Well, woman, just where have you been? 
You come back so love- struck, lovely and vibrant, free and witty. 
Your carrying on has cost me my appetite, sense of smell, color, and 
all my strength.”
She says: “Shut up, murderer! Quit your bellyaching. I’ll 
always be on my guard with you around. That my enemy has been 
wounded— what do we care about that? It makes me glad.”64
These sorts of imaginative conversations allow their authors to articu-
late complex theologies and experiences in vivid and relatable ways, 
 63 Porete, Mirror of Simple Souls, chap. 21, 104.
 64 Mechthild, Flowing Light of the Godhead, bk. 1, chap. 2, p. 41.
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“showing” rather than “telling” how the various aspects of the human 
person relate to one another.
The use of inner dialogue also reflects the enormous importance of 
introspection and self- knowledge in thirteenth- to fifteenth- century 
mystical and contemplative thought.65 A  precondition for spiritual 
growth and mystical union, introspection is also portrayed as the best 
means for gaining knowledge about both self and the divine. Even con-
templatives with vastly different conceptions of the final end of human 
beings (such as Porete and Julian of Norwich) enjoin their readers to 
look inward, not just at the beginning of their spiritual journeys but at 
various intervals along the way.
A classic formulation of this common injunction is found in the pro-
logue to Catherine of Siena’s Dialogue, where Truth proclaims: “Here 
is the way, if you would come to perfect knowledge and enjoyment of 
me, eternal Life:  Never leave the knowledge of yourself.”66 Hadewijch 
gives a fuller description of what this process should look like in a let-
ter to a fellow beguine: “If you wish to experience [God’s perfect love], 
you must first of all learn to know yourselves: in all your conduct, in 
your attraction or aversion, in your behavior, in love, in hate, in fidelity, 
in mistrust, and in all things that befall you.” This self- examination is 
not bound to the present, either, but involves projecting oneself for-
ward into the future: “You must examine yourselves as to how you can 
endure everything disagreeable that happens to you, and how you can 
bear the loss of what gives you pleasure.”67 A  stress on how the self 
develops and changes over time runs throughout contemplative texts 
from this period, demonstrating an underlying assumption about the 
temporal continuity of the self- reflective subject.
 65 For more detailed treatments of self- knowledge in the contemplative tradition, see my “Self- 
Knowledge, Abnegation, and Fulfillment in Medieval Mysticism,” in Self- Knowledge, ed. U. Renz 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 131– 145, and “ ‘Many Know Much, but Do Not Know 
Themselves.’ ”
 66 Catherine of Siena, Dialogue, 29.
 67 Hadewijch, Letter 14, 77.
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4 Looking Forward: Locke and Personalism
So far, I  have laid out how the different contexts in which the term 
“person” is employed in medieval discussions (legal, political, gram-
matical, logical, and theological) overlap in their emphases on sub-
jective individuality, intrinsic dignity, and a broad understanding of 
“rational nature.” I have shown not only how those three features play 
out in thirteenth- to fifteenth- century contemplative literature but also 
how they combine with the use of first— and second— person perspec-
tives, personification of inner dialogue, and an emphasis on introspec-
tion to create a far more “personal” conception of “an individual with 
a rational nature” than is typically associated with the Middle Ages. In 
this concluding section, I briefly sketch how this conception prefigures 
both Locke’s notion of the person and the theory of personalism.
Contemporary philosophical discussions of persons often go back 
only as far as John Locke’s seventeenth- century Essay Concerning 
Human Understanding, in which he characterizes the person as a 
“thinking intelligent Being, that has reason and reflection, and can 
consider it self as it self, the same thinking thing in different times 
and places; which it does by that consciousness, which is inseparable 
from thinking.”68 There are obvious differences between Locke’s defi-
nition and medieval understandings— most significantly, the fact that 
Locke distinguishes between the human being and the human person, 
which medieval treatments of the term “person” do not, and the use of 
the word “consciousness,” which is not yet in play in medieval discus-
sions.69 At the same time, I’m now in a position to show that there is 
a great deal of overlap between thirteenth- to fifteenth- century con-
templative conceptions of what it means to be an individual substance 
 68 Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding 2.27.9.
 69 As I’ve shown, the dignity of humanity and the dignity of the person are inextricably intertwined 
in the Middle Ages via their relation to God; they become separable only after a mechanistic 
worldview starts to crowd out the teleological notion of substantial form, and “human being” 
starts to connote something different from what “person” connotes— an animal body with a soul, 
as opposed to subject of consciousness.
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with a rational nature and Locke’s definition. Central to both are the 
emphases on thinking and intelligence; central to both is the idea of 
the self as reflexive and introspective. Locke and the contemplatives 
also crucially agree that this capacity for self- reflection is what con-
nects humans’ past with their present and future selves.
Another way the medieval contemplative tradition influences later 
theories of persons is via its relation to personalism, a theory that 
takes root in the nineteenth century and flowers in the early twenti-
eth century.70 Personalism sees the line drawn between persons and 
nonpersons as carving nature at its joints: only persons have an aware-
ness of themselves as subjects and agents, only persons are free, and 
only persons bear moral responsibility for their actions. In section 2, 
I described the development in medieval contemplative discussions of 
the ideas of individuality, dignity, and rationality— both in relation to 
self and in relation to God (as triune and as the fully human and fully 
divine Second Person of Christ.) Personalism has a similar emphasis, 
stressing the “moral and religious dimensions which are part and par-
cel of the person’s nature as a conscious, intelligent, free, willing subject 
in relation with God and others.”71
Finally, both the medieval contemplative tradition and personalism 
see creativity and emotionality as intimately connected with rational-
ity. The contemplative genre is designed in part to encourage certain 
affective modes, and one of the main tools of contemplation is intro-
spection, whose language is intimately personal, stressing individual 
accountability and experience. As I showed in section 3, attempts to 
convey the results of such self- reflection give rise in the thirteenth to 
fifteenth centuries to a variety of forms of creative expression, includ-
ing but not limited to poetry, dialogues, and journals which record and 
 70 See  chapter 8 here for further discussion of personalism.
 71 Thomas D. Williams and Jan Olof Bengtsson, “Personalism,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia 
of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta (Summer 2018 ed.), https:// plato.stanford.edu/ archives/ 
sum2018/ entries/ personalism/ .
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explicate mystical experiences. Personalism shares this outlook:  “As 
free, thinking subjects, persons also exercise creativity through their 
thought, imagination, and action, a creativity which affects both the 
surrounding world and the person [herself ].”72 Personalism often 
acknowledges its debt to medieval scholastics such as Thomas Aquinas; 
perhaps it is time for personalism to rediscover its connection to the 
contemplative movement as well.
 72 Williams and Bengtsson, “Personalism.”C4.N72
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